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1 Introduction
In today’s world of e-commerce and the Internet, the role of security protocols
is getting increasingly important. The design of security protocols is diﬃcult
and error-prone [20,2], which makes (automated) veriﬁcation of protocols of
crucial importance. Since the late eighties, one line of research, amongst oth-
ers, for reasoning about security protocols is based on the use of the so-called
BAN logic, proposed by Burrows, Abadi and Needham in [5]. This is an
epistemic logic augmented by constructs that are relevant for reasoning about
security, such as the property of having the disposal of a cryptographic key
to be able to decode a message and therefore to know its contents. Although
many useful results having been reported (e.g., [16,1,21]), due to their com-
plexity and their semantic underpinning the use of BAN logics to prove the
correctness of security protocols has so been of limited success (cf. [3,6,22,19]).
In this paper we will apply insights from dynamic epistemic logics as re-
cently developed by Gerbrandy [13,14], Baltag and Moss [8,4,7], Van Dit-
marsch [10,11], and Kooi [17]. Moreover, contrary to the traditional BAN
logic approach, our approach is semantic or model-theoretic. We use Kripke
models to represent the epistemic state of the agents involved in a protocol,
similarly to the S5 preserving approach of Van Ditmarsch to analyze certain
kinds of games involving knowledge. From Baltag and Moss’ action models
we import the idea to describe belief updates of the agents by semantic oper-
ators transforming the Kripke models at hand by copying and deleting parts
of these models, although we use traditional Kripke models rather than the
more involved action models. To this end we need also operators for unfolding
models, which is in turn inspired by Gerbrandy’s work on possibilities. The
diﬀerence being that in our approach only partial unfolding is called for. We
furthermore propose a language to express belief updates in the context of
security protocols as well as properties of these updates, and give a seman-
tics of this language in terms of the models mentioned and the operators on
them. Since our approach is model-theoretic, we believe that it may serve as
a starting point for the tool-supported veriﬁcation of security protocols.
As a case study illustrating our approach, we will consider the so-called
SRA Three Pass protocol and prove a property of it. It is not our intention to
prove that the protocol is completely secure (as it is not in full generality), but
we will prove that if the agents participating in the protocol are honest, then
an intruder observing the communication does not learn anything about the
plain-text messages in a single run. Furthermore we show what the intruder
is able to learn about the agents participating.
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2 Preliminaries
In this section we brieﬂy discuss some preliminaries and background regarding
the updates we will handle and the epistemic model we will use. First, we
deﬁne the notion of an objective formula and the concept of o-seriality.
Deﬁnition 2.1 Fix a set P of propositional variables, also referred to as
atoms. The class of objective formulas is the smallest class such that
• all propositional variables p ∈ P are objective;
• if φ is objective, then ¬φ is objective;
• if φ1 and φ2 are objective, then φ1 ∧ φ2 is objective.
So, objective formulas do not involve beliefs. For our purposes it is important
that every agent distinguishes a world with the same ‘objective’ information.
This leads to the notion of an o-serial model.
Deﬁnition 2.2 A Kripke model M = 〈S, π, R1, ..., Rm〉 is o-serial iﬀ for all i,
1 ≤ i ≤ m, and w ∈ S, there exists v ∈ S such that (w, v) ∈ Ri and for all
objective formulas φ it holds that (M,w) |= φ ⇔ (M, v) |= φ.
We use a, b, c, etc. as typical agents, taken from a class A. We use the no-
tation {x}ka to denote a message x encrypted with the cryptographic key ka
of agent a. Furthermore, B is used as a doxastic modal operator. For ex-
ample, Baφ should be read as ‘a believes φ’. We interpret formulas on stan-
dard Kripke models (M, s) = (〈S, π, R1, ..., Rm〉, s), where (M, s) |= Biφ iﬀ
∀t ∈ S:Ri(s, t) → (M, t) |= φ. The state s is referred to as the actual world.
We require the relations Ri to be o-serial, transitive and euclidean. This
yields a class of models that we will call Kt45, a proper subset of the class of
models of the well-known doxastic logic KD45. The lower case t refers to the
axiom
Biφ ⇒ φ,(t)
for every objective φ. The system Kt45 is sound with respect to the class of
o-serial, transitive and euclidian models [15]. We will show that the operations
we introduce preserve Kt45. The point is that in worlds of Kt45 models, we
cannot both have Biφ and Bi¬φ, for an objective formula φ. This is reasonable
from our assumption that agents are conscious about the protocol. Therefore,
they will not infer objective contradictions. This objectivity is captured locally
for each state. As a consequence, the operations that we introduce can restrict
the set of states without destroying objective information.
For the analysis of security protocols below, we assume that we are om-
niscient about the values of the variables in diﬀerent runs of a protocol. For
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example, the program variable p in a protocol run has the value [[p]]. In the
real world it is, obviously, always true that p = [[p]]. However, it is cumbersome
to keep track of what is the real world in the operations on Kripke structures
that we employ below. Therefore, we assume that an interpretation [[·]] is
given, that provides the ‘real’ values of the program variables when needed.
It might very well be the case that p 
= [[p]] in a certain state. From now on,
we will abbreviate p = [[p]] to p. (Thus transforming a program expression
into a propositional variable.) Similarly, ¬p is an abbreviation of p 
= [[p]]. For
example, agent a that learns Bbp ∨ Bb¬p, learns that agent b has assigned a
value to the program variable p.
The types of updates we consider are (i) public announcement of a variable,
(ii) the private learning of a variable and (iii) the private learning about the
knowledge of other agents.
The ﬁrst type of update typically runs as follows: In an open network
agent a sends a message to agent b. From a security perspective, it is cus-
tomary to assume the Dolev-Yao framework [12], in which all agents in the
network can read this message too. However, also in open networks private
learning, the second type of update, can take place. For example, agent b
receives a message {x}k from agent a. Here {x}k denotes a message with
content x encrypted with the (symmetric) key k. If b possesses the key k,
then b privately learns the message content x (assuming that the key k is
shared among a and b). The ﬁnal type of update, learning about knowledge
of others, is probably the most interesting. It is realistic to assume that the
steps in a protocol run are known to all agents. Therefore, observing that an
agent receives a message will increase the knowledge of the other agents. For
example, if agent a sends a message {x}k to agent b, then agent c learns that
b has learned the information contained in the message {x}k, but typically, c
does not learn x if c does not possess the key k.
Stronger types of updates we do not consider here. For example, we will not
update the beliefs of an honest agent such that it learns that an intruder has
learned about others. In the present paper, we restrict ourselves to updating
beliefs about objective formulas and beliefs about objective formulas.
3 Update constructions
In this section we describes various types of updates in detail. We will start
by deﬁning an update for propositions in subsection 3.1. In subsection 3.2 we
will deﬁne a belief update for agents that learn something about the belief of
others. We do this in two slightly diﬀerent ways by varying in the functions
that describe a side-eﬀect for an agent.
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3.1 Objective updates
The belief update of objective formulas we will use is based on [18,8]. The
construction works as follows: We will make copies of the states of the model
such that the old worlds in old(S) correspond to the information in the original
model and the new worlds in new(S) correspond to the new information.
Deﬁnition 3.1 Let a world (M,w) = (〈S, π, R1, ..., Rm〉, w), a group of agents
B, and an objective formula φ be given such that (M,w) |= φ. Then
update(φ,B)(M,w) = (〈S
′, π′, R′1, ..., R
′
m〉, w
′)
where
• S ′ = old(S) ∪ {new(s) | (M, s) |= φ}
• w′ = new(w)
• π′(old(u))(p) = π′(new(u))(p) = π(u)(p) for all p ∈ P
• for 1 ≤ i ≤ m the relation R′i on S
′ is minimal such that
R′i(old(u), old(v)) ⇔ Ri(u, v)
R′a(new(u), new(v)) ⇔ Ra(u, v) if a ∈ B
R′b(new(u), old(v)) ⇔ Rb(u, v) if b /∈ B
Note that φ holds in each state in the new part. The following example shows
how this works on a concrete model.
Example 3.2 Consider the model (M, s) in Figure 1a where π(s)(p) =
true and π(t)(p) = false. The operation we execute is that b learns
p, i.e. update(p,b). This results in the model (M,u) in Figure 1b where
new(s) = u, old(s) = v and old(t) = w and π(u)(p) = π(v)(p) = true and
π(w)(p) = false. The world new(t) is unreachable from the actual world and
is therefore omitted from the ﬁgure. (In fact, in all ﬁgures in this paper, we
will omit the unreachable worlds.)
We can see that the belief of agent a has not changed: it still considers its
old worlds possible. The belief of agent b however, has changed. It now only
considers the state u possible where p holds, hence b beliefs p.
The update update(φ,B) is based on a formula φ and a set of agents B.
Roorda et al. [18] have given a characterization of the formulas that are al-
tered by such an operation with a single learning agent. Here we extend the
deﬁnition for multi-agent purposes.
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Fig. 1.
Deﬁnition 3.3 An update function (·)[φ,B] is called proper if
(M,w)[φ,B] |= p ⇔ (M,w) |= p
(M,w)[φ,B] |= α ∧ β ⇔ (M,w)[φ,B] |= α and (M,w)[φ,B] |= β
(M,w)[φ,B] |= ¬α ⇔ (M,w)[φ,B]  α
(M,w)[φ,B] |= Baα ⇔ (M,w) |= Baα if a /∈ B
(M,w)[φ,B] |= Bbα ⇔ Bb(w, u) ∧ (M,u) |= φ) implies
(M,u)[φ,B] |= α) if b ∈ B
Following Roorda et al. we have that update(φ,B) is proper. Moreover,
update(φ,B) is uniquely characterized by Deﬁnition 3.3 upto elementary equiv-
alence, i.e. if (·)[φ,B] is a proper update function, then (M,w)[φ,B] and
update(φ,B) are elementary equivalent.
We collect the following properties of update(φ,B).
Lemma 3.4
(a) For all formula φ it holds that (M,w) |= φ ⇒ update(φ,B)(M,w) |= BBφ.
(b) If a model (M,w) satisﬁes the Kt45 properties and φ is objective, then the
model update(φ,B)(M,w) satisﬁes the Kt45 properties as well.
(c) The models
update(ψ,C)(update(φ,B)(M,w)) and update(φ,B)(update(ψ,C)(M,w))
are bisimilar.
Note that in Lemma 3.4a φ ranges over arbitrary formulas, including non-
objective ones. However, for a non-objective formula, Biφ say, it can happen
that, unintended, an agent increases the objective knowledge encapsulated by
the formula φ. This is illustrated by the next example.
A. Hommersom et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 126 (2005) 53–7558
a, b
s u
a, b a, b
ta b
a, b
s u
a, b a, b
a
ta b
v
b
a. (M, s) b. (M ′, v)
Fig. 2.
Example 3.5 Suppose we are interested in agent a learning the formula Bbp∨
Bb¬p, but not p itself. Consider the Kripke model (M, s) in Figure 2a, where
π(s)(p) = π(u)(p) = true and π(t)(p) = false. This models that b knows
that p is true. Agent a does not know p or ¬p, and it does not know if b knows
p.
If we apply the deﬁnition of the update operation, it results in the model
(M, v) from Figure 2b, where π(v)(p) = π(s)(p) = π(u)(p) = true and
π(t)(p) = false. The reason that it turns out like this, is because the only
state where Bbp∨Bb¬p holds, is the state s. Thus, all the other states have no
corresponding new states that are reachable from the new point v. Figure 2b
illustrates that a has learned Bbp∨Bb¬p, but also that a has learned p itself.
In the next subsection we will deﬁne a side-eﬀect function such that a,
referring to the situation above, will learn about others, but does not learn
any objective formulas itself.
3.2 Side-eﬀects
The main reason that in Example 3.5 the update of Bbp ∨ Bb¬p for agent
a fails, is that it actually deletes the wrong arrows. The update operation
deletes arrows of a to gain the states that satisfy the updating formula. This
is not what we intend. We want a to keep all the states it considers possible,
but at the same time we would like to update all the possible states of a
such that the formula Bbp ∨Bb¬p holds in these states. Moreover, we do not
want to change the knowledge of other agents. In this section we deﬁne the
functions that accomplish these requirements.
A technical obstacle is that states can be shared among agents. It is
obvious that if we change a state with the intention to change the belief of
one agent, then the belief of the other agents that consider this state possible,
is changed as well. Therefore, the ﬁrst thing to do, is to separate the states
of learning agents from the states of agents that do not learn. This procedure
will be called unfolding. The functions newB and orig are generalizations of
new and old from the previous section, but the function orig is only deﬁned
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at the point of the model, i.e. the actual world.
Deﬁnition 3.6 Given a model (M,w) with M = 〈S, π, R1, ..., Rm〉, a parti-
tioning X of the set of agents A, we deﬁne the operation unfoldX (M,w) =
(〈S ′, π′, R′1, ..., R
′
m〉, w
′), where
• S ′ = (
⋃
B∈X newB(S)) ∪ orig(w)
• w′ = orig(w)
• π′(newB(v))(p) = π(v)(p), π
′(w′)(p) = true for all p ∈ P,B ∈ X
• the relation R′i on S
′, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, is minimal such that
R′i(newB(u), newC(v)) ⇔ Ri(u, v) ∧ (B = C)
R′i(orig(w), newB(u)) ⇔ Ri(w, u) ∧ i ∈ B
where B, C range over X .
So for every group of agents B there is copy of the original states (viz. newB(s)
for every s ∈ S). This operation does indeed preserve our Kt45 properties and
it models the same knowledge, which is captured by the following lemma.
A. Hommersom et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 126 (2005) 53–7560
a, b
s u
a, b a, b
ta b
a, b
s′ a b u′
a, b
a b
a, b a, b
a, b a, b
a
b
s
s′′ u′′
t′
t′′
a
a. (M, s) b. (M ′, s)
Fig. 3.
Lemma 3.7
(a) If (M,w) is a Kt45 model and X a partition of ma, then unfoldX (M,w)
is a Kt45 model as well.
(b) For every model (M,w) and partition X of A, it holds that the models
(M,w) and unfoldX (M,w) are bisimilar.
Example 3.8 Consider the Kripke model (M, s) in Figure 3.a with π(s)(p) =
π(u)(p) = true, π(t)(p) = false. So, b knows that p is true, while a does not.
Furthermore, a does not know if b knows p. Now the operation we perform
is unfold{{a},{b}}(M, s) which results in the model (M
′, s) in Figure 3b (with
valuation as expected).
So we have split the knowledge of a and b. The state s is the original state,
the primed states model a’s knowledge and the double primed states model b’s
knowledge. So the upper half of the model represents the knowledge of a, and
the lower half represents the knowledge of b. Note that no states are shared,
in particular because the point of the model is not reﬂexive.
Next, we give some preparatory deﬁnitions leading to the notion of a side-eﬀect
operation in Deﬁntion 3.14. First we deﬁne the notion of a submodel.
Deﬁnition 3.9 A model M = 〈S, π, R1, ..., Rm〉 is a submodel of M
′ =
〈S ′, π′, R′1, ..., R
′
m〉, written as M  M
′, iﬀ S ⊆ S ′, π(s)(p) = π′(s)(p) for
all s ∈ S, p ∈ P and Ri ⊆ R
′
i.
Next, we construct a submodel that represents the knowledge of an agent a.
Deﬁnition 3.10 Given a model (M,w) = (〈S, π, R1, ..., Rm〉, w) and a par-
tition { {a},B } of A such that (M,w) = unfold{{a},B}(M
′, w′) such that
{{a},B} for some model (M ′, w′), the a-submodel suba(M) of M for a is
given by (M ′, w′) = 〈S ′, π′, R′1, ..., R
′
m〉 where
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Fig. 4. a-submodel outline
• s ∈ S ′ ⇔ newa(s) ∨ orig(s)
• π′(newa(s))(p) = π
′(orig(s))(s) = π(s)(p) for all p ∈ P
• R′i(s, t) ⇔ Ri(s, t) ∧ s, t ∈ S
′.
Clearly an a-submodel is a submodel in the sense of Deﬁnition 3.9. The
restmodel is the part of the model that is complements the submodel with
respect to the accessibility relation.
Deﬁnition 3.11 Given a model (M,w) = 〈S, π, R1, ..., Rm〉 and a submodel
N = 〈S ′′, π′′, R′′1, ..., R
′′
m〉 of M , the restmodel restN(M) of M with respect
to N is given by restN(M) = 〈S
′, π′, R′1, ..., R
′
m〉 where
• s ∈ S ′ ⇔ s ∈ S ∧ ∃(u, v) ∈ R′i: u = s ∨ v = s
• π′(s)(p) = π(s)(p) for all p ∈ P
• R′i(s, t) ⇔ Ri(s, t) ∧ ¬R
′′
i (s, t)
We can see the a-submodel and restmodel deﬁnitions in action by taking the
model of Example 3.8 and applying the above deﬁnitions. See Figure 4. This
exactly corresponds to the idea of two submodels that represent knowledge of
diﬀerent agents.
Now we would like to update the belief of some agents. To this end, we
want to replace the submodel that represents their belief by a new model. For
this, we introduce the replace operation.
Deﬁnition 3.12 Given a model N = 〈S, π, R1, ..., Rm〉, a model M , a sub-
model N ′ such that N  N ′  M with restN ′(M) = 〈S
′, π′, R′1, ..., R
′
m〉, we
deﬁne replaceN ′(N,M) = 〈S
′′, π′′, R′′1 , ..., R
′′
m〉 where
• s ∈ S ′′ ⇔ s ∈ S ∨ s ∈ S ′
• π′′(s)(p) = π(s)(p) for s ∈ S ′′ for all p ∈ P
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Fig. 5. (M ′′, s)
• R′′i (s, t) ⇔ (s, t) ∈ Ri ∨ (s, t) ∈ R
′
i.
The idea is that once the belief is completely separated, we can not only safely
change the belief of a certain agent, but also preserve the Kt45 properties. In
particular, we change locally the knowledge of an agent a, e.g. regarding uncer-
tainty of another agent b about a propositin p. The operation atomsplit(p,b)
below removes the arrows of b between states that have a diﬀerent valuation
for p.
Deﬁnition 3.13 Given a model M = 〈S, π, R1, ..., Rm〉, we deﬁne a function
atomsplit(p,b)(M) = 〈S
′, π′, R′1, ..., R
′
m〉 as follows:
• s ∈ S ′ ⇔ s ∈ S
• π′(s)(p) = π(s)(p) for all p ∈ P
• R′i(s, t) ⇔ Ri(s, t) (i 
= b)
• R′b(s, t) ⇔ Rb(s, t) ∧ π(s)(p) = π(t)(p).
Finally, we are in a position to deﬁne the actual side-eﬀect function that ties
these things together.
Deﬁnition 3.14 For a model (M,w) put (M ′, w′) = unfold{{a},A\{a}}(M,w)
and N = suba(M
′). The model side-effect(p,a,b)(M,w), the side-eﬀect for a
learning b knowing p, is given by
side-effect(p,a,b)(M,w) = (replaceN(atomsplitp,b(N),M
′), w′).
Example 3.15 We continue Example 3.8. To the a-submodel of M we now
apply atomsplitp,b which results in the model (M
′′, s) in Figure 5. The
arrow (t′, u′) has disappeared, since π(t′)(p) 
= π(u′)(p). Therefore, u′ is not
reachable anymore from the actual world, and can be dropped. Notice that a
believes Bbp ∨ Bb¬p, while a has learned nothing about p itself.
We have the following results.
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Lemma 3.16
(a) If (M,w) is a Kt45-model, then side-effect(p,a,b)(M,w) is a Kt45-model
as well.
(b) Given a model (M,w), agents a, b, c, d, two propositions p, q ∈ P, it holds
that the models
side-effect(p,c,d)(side-effect(q,a,b)(M,w))
and
side-effect(q,a,b)(side-effect(p,c,d)(M,w))
are bisimilar.
(c) Given a model (M,w), agents a, b, c, a proposition p ∈ P and an objective
formula φ, it holds that the models
side-effect(p,c,d)(update(φ,a)(M,w))
and
update(φ,a)(side-effect(p,c,d)(M,w))
are bisimilar.
Next, we consider how the formulas are altered by the side-eﬀect function. We
will partially answer this by presenting a few interesting formulas that hold
in the resulting model. We will look at groups of agents instead of a single
agent:
(i) the group of agents that learn about other agents, ranged over by a;
(ii) the group of agents that is learned about, ranged over by b;
(iii) other agents, ranged over by c.
The fact that the agents of type a are the only agents that learn at all, is
clear. The other agents consider their old worlds possible; their belief has not
changed. With this in mind, we present a few properties of the side-eﬀect
function.
Lemma 3.17 Let a, b and c be three diﬀerent agents. Given a model (M,w)
and the model (M ′, w′) = side-effect(p,a,b)(M,w), it holds that
(a) (M ′, w′) |= Ba(Bbp ∨ Bb¬p)
(b) (M ′, w′) |= Baφ iﬀ (M,w) |= Baφ for φ objective
(c) (M ′, w′) |= BaCabc(Bbp ∨ Bb¬p)
(d) (M ′, w′) |= Biφ iﬀ (M,w) |= Biφ for i 
= a.
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Part (a) of the above lemma states that agent a obtains derived knowledge
of an agent b. Part (b) states that no object knowledge is learned. Part (c)
phrases that agent a considers the rest of the agents as smart itself. Finally,
part (d) captures that other agents do not learn.
Property (c) is a reasonable assumption of a about the other agents in
the context of open communication networks (as is the setting of Sections 4
and 5). If one agent believes that another agent knows the value of p, then
it is reasonable to assume that another agent will believe the same. On the
other hand common knowledge might be too strong to assume.
We show how to reﬁne the approach above by distinguishing between agents
that are considered to have equal learning facilities and thos that do not. I.e.,
we split the former group of other agents in those that commonly learn and
thos that will remain ignorant. We represent this by linking a’s beliefs of those
other agents back to the original (unmodiﬁed) states. We now distinguish four
diﬀerent type of groups of agents.
(i) the group A of agents that learn about other agents, ranged over by a;
(ii) the group B of agents that is learned about, ranged over by b;
(iii) the group C of agents of which agents a believe they have commonly
learned about agents in group b with, ranged over by c;
(iv) the group D of agents of which agents in a believe they have learned
nothing about, ranged over by d.
For simplicity of presentation, we assume that there is exactly 1 agent present
in each group, i.e. A = {a, b, c, d}. We deﬁne the new side-eﬀect operation
0-unfold (where 0 refers to zero-knowledge). Note that the 0-unfold oper-
ation depends on the particular partinioning of agents A. Since the operation
s0-ide-effect will depend on the unfold operation, the side-eﬀect function
is also taken with respect to some chosen partitioning of the agent set.
Deﬁnition 3.18 Given a model (M,w) such that M = 〈S, π, Ra, ..., Rd〉, we
deﬁne a function 0-unfold(M,w) = (〈S ′, π′, R′a, ..., R
′
d〉, w
′), where
• S ′ = newa(S) ∪ newbcd(S) ∪ orig(w)
• w′ = orig(w)
• π′(newB(v))(p) = π(v)(p) and π
′(orig(w))(p) = π(w)(p) for all p ∈ P,
B ∈ {{a}, {bcd}}
• R′i on S
′, i ∈ { a, b, c, d }, is minimal such that
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R′d(newa(u), newbcd(v)) ⇔ Rd(u, v)
R′i(newa(u), newa(v)) ⇔ Ri(u, v) (i 
= d)
R′i(newbcd(u), newbcd(v)) ⇔ Ri(u, v)
R′a(orig(w), newa(v)) ⇔ Ra(w, v)
R′i(orig(w), newbcd(v)) ⇔ Ri(w, v) ∧ i = b, c, d
So instead of completely separating the knowledge of te agent a with the other
agents, we share the knowledge of a about d with the other agents. Since the
other agents do not learn anything, a does not gain knowledge about d. We
present a lemma similar to Lemma 3.7.
Lemma 3.19
(a) If (M,w) is a Kt45 model, then so is 0-unfold(M,w).
(b) For every model (M,w) it holds that the models (M,w) and
0-unfold(M,w) are bisimilar.
Due to the case distinction for R′a(orig(w), newB(v)) in Deﬁnition 3.18 above,
it holds that the knowledge of a about b is not related to the knowledge of
other agents about b or of b itself. So, as before, we can ‘cut out’ the submodel
containing the b arrows from the belief of a:
Deﬁnition 3.20 Given a model (M ′, w′) = 〈S ′, π′, R′a, ..., R
′
d〉 such that
(M ′, w′) =
0-unfold(M,w), for some (M,w), deﬁne b-sub(M ′) = 〈S ′′, π′′, R′′a, ..., R
′′
d〉
where
• S ′′ = { newa(s) | s ∈ S }
• π′′(s)(p) ⇔ π(s)(p) for all p ∈ P
• R′′b (s, t) ⇔ R
′
b(s, t) for s, t ∈ S
′′
• R′′i = ∅ (i 
= b).
The operation 0-side-effectp is then given by
0-side-effectp(M,w) = (replaceN (atomsplit(p,b)(N),M
′), w′)
where N = b-sub(M ′).
Again, the operation respect the Kt45 -properties.
Lemma 3.21 If (M,w) is a Kt45-model, then so is the model
0-side-effectp(M,w).
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Fig. 6.
Similarly to Lemma 3.16 and Lemma 3.17 we have the following result.
Lemma 3.22
(a) If (M,w) is a Kt45-model, then so is 0-side-effectp(M,w).
(b) Given a model (M,w) and the model (M ′, w′) = 0-side-effectp(M,w), it
holds that
(i) (M ′, w′) |= Ba(Bbp ∨Bb¬p)
(ii) (M ′, w′) |= Baφ iﬀ (M,w) |= Baφ for φ objective
(iii) (M ′, w′) |= BaCabc(Bbp ∨Bb¬p)
(iv) (M ′, w′) |= Biφ iﬀ (M,w) |= Biφ for i 
= a
(v) (M ′, w′) |= BaBdφ iﬀ (M,w) |= BaBdφ
Parts (i) to (iv) compare to the properties given in Lemma 3.17. Part (v)
states that the knowledge of agent a about agent d has not changed, exactly
as desired.
Example 3.23 Recall the model (M, s) from Example 3.8 (Figure 3.a).
We now present this model with four agents {a, b, c, d} in Figure 6.a such
that π(s)(p) = π(u)(p) = true and π(t)(p) = false. Now, we apply
0-side-effectp(M,w) and we obtain the model (M
′, s) from Figure 6.b
such that π(s)(p) = π(s′)(p) = π(s′′)(p) = π(u′′)(p) = true, π(t′)(p) =
π(t′′)(p) = false. Note that in the latter model, in agreement with clause (v)
of Lemma 3.22b a still knows exactly the same about d as it did before.
4 A logical language for security protocols
In this section we exploit the ideas of the previous section for a logical language
to reason about security protocols. The expand and side-effect operations
are used for its semantics. The usage of the language is illustrated for the
A. Hommersom et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 126 (2005) 53–75 67
case of the SRA Three Pass protocol. We describe how the various steps of
the protocols change the initial knowledge of the agents involved and what
Kripke-structure is ﬁnally obtained.
Deﬁnition 4.1 Fix a set of proposition P, ranged over by p, and a set of
agents A of m elements, ranged over by a. The language LC is given by
φ ::= p | ¬φ | φ1 ∧ φ2 | Biφ | [σ]φ
σ ::= Priv(i → j, p) | Pub(i, p) | σ; σ′
The σ symbol denotes a (possibly composed) communication action. The
action Priv(i → j, p) is a private or peer-to-peer message p from i to j; the
action Pub(i, p) means a public announcement or a broadcast by i about p.
In the latter every agent on the network learns p, whereas in the former only j
learns p. The bracket operator [σ]φ has the interpretation that after executing
the communication action, φ holds.
The subscript in LC refers to a set of so-called transition rules C. The
transition rules capture the updates, i.e. the updates and side-eﬀects, necessary
for the interpretation of the constructs Priv(i → j, p) and Pub(i, p). The
transitions rules enforce consistency among the propositions that hold. For
example, if an agent believes that the value of a message m is [[m]] and possesses
a key k(a), then it must believe that the value of the encryption Ek(a)(m) of m
has a value that corresponds with [[m]].
A transition rule has either the form Bip ⇒ β or Hip ⇒ β. Bip and Hip
are conditions, expressing that p must be believed by agent i or that p has
been delivered to agent i, respectively. The body β of a transition rule is a
sequence of actions α1; . . . ;αn. Actions come in two ﬂavours, viz. LBp and
Si,jp. Here, an action LBp expresses that p is learned among the agents in the
set B and corresponds to belief update, whereas an action Sa,bp expresses the
side-eﬀect that the agent a has learned that agent b now knows about p.
As an example, we will have the transition rule Bb{x}k ⇒ Lab{x}k, when
agents a and b share the key k and a sends b the message {x}k. A typical
application of an Hip ⇒ β transition rule is in a protocol that uses a challenge.
In the situation described above, agent a sends the message x to agent b and
agent b returns the message {x}k. Since it is shared, a already can compute
{x}k itself, so the delivery of {x}k does not teach a anything about this value.
But, since it must come from b, the agent a does learn that b has the shared
key and authenticates b toward a. The transition rule in this case is Ha{x}k ⇒
Sa,bk, stating that agent a, on observing {x}k, learns that agent b knows the
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right value of the key k.
The semantics for the language LC , provided in the next deﬁnition, follows
the set-up of [8,10]
Deﬁnition 4.2 Let C be a set of transition rules. For σ ∈ LC the relation
[[σ]] on models for A over P is given by
• (M,w)[[Priv(i→ j, p)]](M ′, w′)
⇔ (M,w) |= Bip ⇒ (expandp,j(M,w) p (M
′, w′))
(M,w)[[Pub(i, p)]](M ′, w′)
⇔ (M,w) |= Bip ⇒ (expandp,A(M,w) p (M
′, w′))
(M,w)[[σ; σ′]](M ′, w′)
⇔ (M,w)[[σ]](M ′′, w′′)[[σ′]](M ′, w′) for some model (M ′′, w′′)
• (M,w) p (M
′, w′) ⇔
if (x ⇒ β) ∈ Mod(M,w, p)
then (M,w) 〈β〉 (M ′′, w′′) p (M
′, w′) for some (M ′′, w′′)
else (M,w) = (M ′, w′)
• (M,w) 〈〉 (M ′, w′) ⇔ (M,w) = (M ′, w′)
(M,w) 〈LBp; β〉 (M
′, w′) ⇔ expand(p,B)(M,w)〈β〉(M
′, w′)
(M,w) 〈Si,jp; β〉 (M
′, w′) ⇔ side-effect(p,i,j)(M,w) 〈β〉 (M
′, w′)
• (M,w) |= p ⇔ π(w)(p) = true
(M,w) |= ¬φ ⇔ (M,w)  φ
(M,w) |= φ ∧ ψ ⇔ (M,w) |= φ and (M,w) |= ψ
(M,w) |= Biφ ⇔ (M, v) |= φ for all v such that wRiv
(M,w) |= [σ]φ ⇔ (M ′, w′) |= φ if (M,w)[[σ]](M ′, w′)
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• Mod(M,w, p) =
{Bip ⇒ β ∈ C | (M,w) 〈β〉 (M
′, w′),
(M ′, w′) |= φ 
↔(M,w) |= φ, (M,w) |= Bip } ∪
{Hip ⇒ β ∈ C | (M,w) 〈β〉 (M
′, w′), (M ′, w′) |= φ 
↔(M,w) |= φ }
The operation p applies a number of transition rules after the execution of a
communication action. For the transition rules of type Bip ⇒ β it is checked
if the precondition Bip holds.
The selection Mod(M,w) is organized in such a way that no transition
rule is applied over and over again. The recursive deﬁnition of  therefore
is well-deﬁned, since it stops if no fresh transition rule can be applied. In
the deﬁnition of Mod it is checked if the belief of the agents changes under
the transition rules, preventing an inﬁnite chain of rewrites for p . Note that
because of the results of the previous section, the order of applying these
transition rules does not matter.
5 The SRA Three Pass protocol
In this section we discuss how the machinery developed above works out for
a concrete example. Preparatory for this, in order to keep the models within
reasonable size, we employ two helpful tricks. The ﬁrst one is the disregarding
of propositions not known to any agent. Thus, if a proposition is not part of
the model, then the interpretation is that no agent has any knowledge about
it. What we than have to specify is how we add that proposition into the
model. We accomplish this by making two copies of the original states. One
of them we assign ‘positive’ and the other ‘negative’. In the positive states,
the proposition will be true, and in the negative states, the proposition will
be false.
Deﬁnition 5.1 Given a model (M,w) = 〈S, π, R1, ..., Rm〉 we deﬁne the func-
tion addatomp such that (M
′, w′) = addatomp(M,w) = 〈S
′, π′, R′1, ..., R
′
m〉
where
• S ′ = pos(S) ∪ neg(S)
• π′(pos(s))(q) = if p = q then true else π(s)(q)
• π′(neg(s))(q) = if p = q then false else π(s)(q)
• R′i(α(s), β(t))⇔ Ri(s, t), α, β = pos, neg
• w′ = pos(w)
We have the following property.
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Lemma 5.2 Given a model (M,w) and (M ′, w′) = addatomp(M,w) it holds
that
• (M ′, w′) |= p
• (M,w) |= φ ⇔ (M ′, w′) |= φ for p 
∈ φ∗ with φ∗ the closure under subfor-
mulas of φ
• for all i ∈ A: (M ′, w′) 
|= Bip.
The second trick helps to prevent the useless applying of rules which keeps
the model in a reasonable size.
Lemma 5.3 Given a model (M,w), the model (M ′, w′) such that
(M,w)〈Lip;Sjip〉x[Pub(i, p)](M
′, w′)
(for some x, i, j) and the model (M ′′, w′′) such that (M,w)〈LAp〉(M
′′, w′′) are
bisimilar.
That is to say, if an agent i learns p and then all other agents learn about i that
it has learned p, followed by the action where everyone learns p (commonly),
then it is equivalent to say that they have just learned p commonly.
Shamir, Rivest and Adelman have suggested the three-pass protocol [9] for
the transmission a message under minimal assumptions for commutative en-
cryption. It is known to be insecure and various attacks have been suggested.
However, it serves an illustrative purpose here. The protocol has the following
steps:
(i) a→ b : {x}ka
(ii) b → a : {{x}ka}kb
(iii) a→ b : {x}kb
Both agent a and b have their own encryption key, ka and kb, respectively.
The encryption key can be a symmetric key or a the private key of a private
key-public key-pair for that matter. Agent a wants to send message x to
agent b through an insecure channel and therefore wants to send x encrypted
to b. It does this by sending x encrypted with its own key. Next, b will
encrypt this message with b’s key and sends this back. Since the encryption
is commutative, a can now decrypt this message and sends this to b. Finally,
b can decrypt the message it has just received and learn the value of x.
We consider three agents {a, b, i} where a and b are honest agents that
will run this protocol and i is the intruder that looks at the messages that
are being transmitted through the network. So we’re interested, if i does not
actively attack the protocol, what i can learn during the run of this protocol.
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Next, we deﬁne the transition rules. The ﬁrst transition rule models the
fact that agents can encrypt with their own key: BjmK ⇒ LjmK+j ;SijmK+j
and, for j ∈ K, BjmK ⇒ LjmK−j;SijmK−j, for all j ∈ A, where K is some
set of agents, + a function that adds an agent and − a function that deletes
one. Here, mK represent a message successively encrypted with the keys of
the agents in K. In the modeling, we limit ourselves by deﬁning the list
of useful propositions. The propositions we want to consider here are P =
{m,ma, mb, mab} where ma abbreviates {x}ka = [[{x}ka ]] and mab abbreviates
{{x}ka}kb = [[{{x}ka}kb]].
We assume that
• encryption is commutative, i.e. {{x}ka}kb = {{x}kb}ka (in the actual world);
• every agent has its own key not possessed by any other agent;
• during the run of the protocol, the value of the keys do not change.
m,ma
b, i
b, i
b, i
b, i
b, i
¬m,ma
b, i
m,¬ma
b, i
¬m,¬ma
a, b, i
b, i
b, i
a, b, i b, i
b, im,ma ¬m,ma
a. starting point b. after Pub(a,ma)
Fig. 7.
The next assumption we must make is about the knowledge state of the
agents before the run of the protocol. We will assume that a is the only agent
that knows m and ma. Furthermore, we will assume that the other agents
know this about a. The corresponding Kripke structure is in Figure 7.a.
The ﬁrst step is executed. That is, ma is propagated on the network,
so all agents will learn this value. Thus, we execute the action Pub(a,ma).
If we discard the states that become unreachable, this results in the model
of Figure 7.b Note that this model models Bbma. This triggers one of the
transition rules, that is, it triggers Bbma ⇒ Lbmab;Sibmab since the antecedent
holds in the point now.
We have not modelled mab yet, so this is the ﬁrst step. We will not repeat
ma in the ﬁgure since this holds in any state of the model. The function
addatommab results in the model of Figure 8.a. Observe that in the next
step of the protocol LAmab (Pub(b,mab)) is executed, since the message is
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a. added mab b. after Pub(b,mab))
Fig. 8.
being transmitted to all agents on the network. So with Lemma 5.3 it is
justiﬁed to skip the steps that are required by the transition rules. Thus, we
get the model in Figure 8.b. This results in the triggering of the transition
rule: Bamab ⇒ Lamb;Siamb. This is in fact a completely similar case as in
the previous step of the protocol. Again we dismiss the mab proposition since
every agent has learned this.
a, b, i b, i
b, im,mb ¬m,mb
Fig. 9. after Pub(a,mb)
We introduce mb and execute Pub(a,mb) because we can again skip the
actions in the transition rules (Lemma 5.3). So we end up with the model
in Figure 9. The last transition rule that is triggered is Bbmb ⇒ Lbm;Sibm.
Again, we discard the proposition that holds in every state: mb. We now only
focus on the most interesting proposition m. First b learns m which results in
the model in Figure 10.a.
The second action for the transition rule is that i learns that Bbp ∨Bb¬p.
If we execute this on the model we get the model (M ′, w′) which can be seen
in Figure 10.b. Recall that we have
(M ′, w′) = [Pub(a,ma);Pub(b,mab);Pub(a,mb)](M,w).
It holds that: (M ′, w′) |= ¬Bim, (M
′, w′) |= Bbm and (M
′, w′) |= Bi((Bbm ∨
Bb¬m) ∧Ba(Bbm ∨ Bb¬m)).
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6 Conclusion
Inspired by recent work on dynamic epistemic logics, we have proposed a log-
ical language for describing (properties of) runs of security protocols. The
language contains constructs for the two basic types of epistemic actions that
happen during such runs. The semantics of the language is based on tradi-
tional Kripke models representing the epistemic state of the agents involved
in the protocol at hand. Changes in the epistemic state of the agent system
as a result of the execution of a protocol are described by means of transi-
tion rules that precisely indicate what belief updates happen under certain
preconditions. These belief updates give rise to modiﬁcations of the models
representing the agents’ epistemic state in a way that is precisely given by
semantic operations on these models. We have illustrated our approach for a
well-known security protocols such as the SRA Three Pass protocol. We also
have analyzed the Needham-Schro¨der public key protocol and Andrew RPC,
see [15]. It should be noted, that we focus here on single protocol runs with
passive intruder. A further research goal is to extend our approach to deal
with a setting of multiple protocols/multiple runs and active intruder.
The semantic updates we used operate on traditional Kripke models as
opposed to updates in the approaches of Gerbrandy and Baltag. We believe
that this will make it less troublesome to integrate these updates into existing
model checkers, which hopefully will lead to better and new tools for the
veriﬁcation of properties of security protocols.
Although future research will have to justify this, we are conﬁdent that our
method can be employed for a broad class of veriﬁcation problems concerning
security protocols because of the ﬂexibility of our approach using transition
rules for epistemic updates.
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